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Serving as an Outside Director 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Serving as an outside director can be an 
absorbing challenge because it involves 
balancing three important aspects of the 
role-representing the interests of the 
shareholders, making a contribution to the 
company, and maintaining professional in-
dependence. It would be presumptuous of 
any one person currently serving as a cor-
porate director to state exactly how these 
three factors should be balanced by each 
outside director. 
The way in which anyone works out the 
three aspects of the director's role must de-
pend on the nature of the company, the 
problems and opportunities that it faces, 
and the composition of the Board itself. 
Therefore, I will limit this article to my per-
sonal experiences, mainly explaining how I 
view my task in the several Boards that I 
serve on. Perhaps these thoughts will en-
courage other directors, with different and 
broader backgrounds, to present their ideas 
on the subject. 
The Role of the Outside Director 
First of all, I believe that it is clear that 
the directors of a corporation represent its 
stockholders. That certainly should be true 
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of independent outside directors. I am a 
member of the traditional school who does 
not believe in constituency directors. Thus, 
I do not view my position as representing 
56-year old male Republican college pro-
fessors from Missouri-or any other group 
that I happen to belong to, other than the 
shareholders of the company. 
Ralph Nader has proposed national elections 
for Board members of major companies. 
I would propose as a start electing 
the members of the rubber-stamp Board 
of his conglomerate. 
Although I do not represent any special 
interest, I do feel free to contribute the 
special expertise that I have. In my case, it 
is economics. But if government wants to 
regulate companies and influence their 
behavior, they will have to do it from the 
outside, and certainly not via this director. 
I know that Ralph Nader has proposed na-
tional elections for Board members of ma-
jor companies. If he is so enamored of the 
idea, I would propose as a start electing the 
members of the rubber-stamp Board of his 
conglomerate. My candidate is former In-
terior Secretary, James Watt! But, until 
then, I suggest that the allegiance of direc-
tors to the shareholders who elect them is 
fundamental. 
How do you represent the shareholders at 
the meetings of the Board? Personally, I try 
to follow a variation of the Socratic method. 
I mainly ask questions. Of course, I try to 
avoid second-guessing the management. A 
company does not benefit from either a 
totally compliant Board nor from one that 
tries to dominate the management. My at-
titude is that a strong management is 
cultivated by providing some guidance to it. 
2 
If the company has that type of manage-
ment, asking the right questions may be 
sufficient. 
If the management seems too dense to get 
your message, the company may have the 
wrong management-or you may have been 
too subtle. But if you really get a brush off 
on something you consider important, 
speak to the other directors. There is 
nothing like introducing a well-prepared 
motion to get the chairman's attention. 
In any event, the director needs to exer-
cise discretion in carrying out the role. If 
you are asking questions on every item on 
the agenda, you are probably becoming a 
nuisance and diluting your effectiveness. 
But, if meeting after meeting goes by and 
you do not open your mouth-except to 
second the motion to adopt the minutes-
then you probably are not earning your di-
rector's fee. 
Often, outside directors will be expected 
to draw on their particular expertise. If an 
acquisition is being considered, an invest-
ment banker-or the Chief Executive Of-
ficer of another company-may point out 
some of the unexpected problems that 
could arise. A consideration of the sales 
forecast may benefit from the economist 
commenting on the business outlook. The 
review of international activities can be a 
useful point at which a banker on the 
Board discusses the foreign exchange situa-
tion. None of this should be aimed at re-
placing the role of the internal management 
and staff, or to be competitive with them. It 
is more a matter of providing another or at 
least broader viewpoint. 
Relations with Management 
The interactions with the CEO are vital 
for the outside director. The subtlety of the 
3 
relationship arises particularly because of 
the presence of other members of the 
senior management on the Board, the "in-
side" directors. The outside director must 
remember that the CEO-chairman (assum-
ing that the customary dual title obtains) 
has to deal on a day-to-day basis with the 
other inside directors in a leadership 
fashion. 
Thus, I often find it useful to com-
municate ideas or concerns to the Board 
chairman in an informal way. He is not put 
on the spot. (By the way, I am not being 
sexist; it is just that I have never served on 
a Board with a female chairwoman.) Of 
course, if I am not satisfied by the Chair-
man's response, I feel free to raise the mat-
ter at a Board or committee meeting. But, 
especially on touchy matters such as per-
sonnel, at least I have put him on notice. 
Much can be written on the limits to the 
director's role. Though much as it may be 
tempting, outside directors should refrain 
from taking on management's responsibil-
ities. One of the more frequent oppor-
tunities-which I always decline-is to an-
swer calls from reporters inquiring about 
some aspect of company policy or opera-
tions. In what invariably turns out to be a 
very short interview, I tell them that in no 
way will I act as a spokesman for the com-
pany or even talk about the organization. 
Any question about the firm should be di-
rected to the management. 
Of course, I am generally available to 
answer calls about economic trends and 
other business policy matters unrelated to 
the specific companies on whose Board I 
serve. But those calls always come on other 
occasions. 
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Serving on Committees 
The matter of Board committees is of 
special importance. Much of the work of 
the Board is performed in those smaller 
groups. The Audit Committee is, in effect, 
the watchdog of the corporation. The Nomi-
nating Committee is initially responsible for 
what may be the Board's most basic func-
tion: providing for the succession of top 
management, and also for naming new di-
rectors. The Compensation Committee is 
concerned with providing proper incentives 
for performance. In each of these areas, it 
seems clear that independent outside direc-
tors are required, at least in large propor-
tion, for the proper performance of the 
task. In the case of the Audit Committee, 
the regulations of the New York Stock Ex-
change limit membership to independent 
outside directors. 
More balanced mixes of inside and out-
side directors, on the other hand, may be 
useful in the case of other committees such 
as Finance and Public Policy. Especially if 
it is charged with the review of potential 
acquisitions and other major investments, 
the Finance Committee needs the institu-
tional knowledge of key inside directors. A 
similar situation occurs in the Public Policy 
Committee. The outside directors may be 
particularly knowledgable about the exter-
nal social and political environment facing 
I would caution against the type of 
Executive Committee that is so dominated 
by insiders and long-term outsiders that it 
becomes, in effect, a senior management 
operating committee. 
the company. But the inside directors know 
the actual interactions with government 
and public interest groups. 
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The Executive Committee, in contrast, is 
generally dominated by inside directors. 
They have the expertise and also the time, 
in the case of the executive committees that 
meet frequently. However, I would caution 
against the type of Executive Committee 
that is so dominated by insiders and long-
term outsiders that it becomes, in effect, a 
senior management operating committee, 
and not an arm of the Board itself. To be 
sure, in practice each company may have 
its own variation of the composite or typi-
cal committee structure that I have just 
described. Some Boards may prefer fewer 
committees while other Boards may desire 
for their members to be involved in other 
matters. 
The "mixed" Board provides a built-in 
opportunity to balance the pressures for 
dividends and retained earnings. 
Clearly the corporate Board of Directors, 
both in plenary sessions and acting through 
its committees, deals (or at least it should) 
with the issues that are fundamental to the 
future of the organization. Perhaps that is 
the ultimate justification for maintaining a 
Board with both inside and outside direc-
tors. The non-employees bring a detachment 
(I always hesitate to say objectivity) to the 
task, while the insiders bring to bear a uni-
que understanding of the firm-its people, 
internal working relationships, customers 
and supplier dealings, and often rich in-
stitutional knowledge. Also, the outside di-
rectors are given an opportunity to meet, 
work with, and observe in action those 
members of the senior management who 
may be considered for the top slot in the 
future. 
Another value of the "mixed" Board is 
that it provides a built-in opportunity to 
6 
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balance the pressures for dividends and re-
tained earnings. Often many shareholders 
emphasize the short-run benefits of increas-
ed income, while management is more con-
cerned about investing in the company's 
future growth. Also, the officers may simply 
find it easier or at least more satisfactory 
to use retained earnings rather than going 
to the credit markets. For the typical bus-
iness firm, this is not an either-or choice, 
but a case of balancing two important and 
basic considerations. 
Although I share the prevailing view that 
the Board should consist primarily of out-
side directors, I must report an uncomfor-
table feeling. I know of no comprehensive 
analysis that demonstrates that the perfor-
mance of companies with outside-domi-
nated Boards is superior to that of com-
panies relying primarily on management di-
rectors. Perhaps that simply reflects the 
fact that, to my knowledge, nobody has un-
dertaken such a study. In any event, there 
I know of no comprehensive analysis that 
demonstrates that the performance of com-
panies with outside-dominated Boards is 
superior to that of companies relying 
primarily 011 management directors. 
is no shortage of anecdotal information 
about the shortcomings of specific com-
panies with mainly inside directors-such 
as paying top management far more gen-
erously than other companies in the in-
dustry whose performance is superior in 
terms of sales and profitability. 
The Independence of the Outside Director 
In any event, it would seem clear that, for 
the outside director to exercise effectively 
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the role of objective overseer of corporate 
activity, he or she truly has to enjoy a posi-
tion of independence. In judging the quality 
of independence, I find legal requirements 
and definitions useful but not ultimately 
satisfying. 
Of course, it is important to avoid techni-
cal, i.e., legal conflicts of interest-such as 
an officer of a major supplier or customer 
serving on the Board. Yet I find that in-
dependence must be broader than that. 
Thus, I find myself in opposition to the sug-
gestions that are made from time to time to 
provide such generous fees, and supporting 
staff, that the director can devote a very 
substantial portion of his or her total pro-
fessional time to the role. 
I believe that directors should be ade-
quately compensated and should take the 
task seriously. The economist in me urges 
awareness of competition, in this case in 
the market for quality directors. Yet, I op-
pose those proposals because they would 
tend to give the director too great a finan-
cial stake in holding on to the job. Thus, 
one of my personal tests of a truly indepen-
dent outside director is how important is 
the income from Board service to him or 
her. 
One of my personal tests of a truly indepen-
dent outside director is how important is the 
income from Board service to him or her. 
To be specific, I served on the Board of 
one company whose key policies I came to 
disagree with strongly. After raising the 
issue at Board meetings and not obtaining 
support from other members, I decided not 
to run for reelection. Given my preferences 
in working relationships, it was a very quiet 
departure. Yet I did so without giving any 
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thought to the loss of director's fees be-
cause remuneration from that Board ser-
vice was not an important part of my total 
income. 
Nevertheless, I do not believe that a com-
pany is an eleemosynary institution. Direc-
tor's fees should be in alignment with re-
sponsibility, time spent, and comparability. 
But clearly much of the income is psychic 
or otherwise non-financial. How else do you 
explain a $1 million a year CEO serving on 
a Board of another company? 
The New Director 
What advice can be given to the new 
member of a Board of Directors? All I can 
report is the attitude that I have tried to 
take when joining a Board-that I will have 
to learn a lot before hitting my stride. That 
learning process covers the company's ac-
tivities and history, its people, and especial-
ly the variety of formal and informal in-
teractions with the other members of the 
Board. 
Although it may go against the grain, I try 
not to assume that the firms that I was 
previously affiliated with always followed 
the right approach, and that any departures 
from that path by this company whose 
Board I have just joined is wrong or at best 
merely backward. Easier said than done, of 
course. 
To the new director, I would urge you not 
to feel obliged to say more than "Hello" 
and "Thank You" at your first or second 
Board meeting. You can learn a lot by 
listening- and looking at the interactions 
among the various Board members and 
with the management representatives. To 
belabor the obvious, that is why teachers 
like to use the blackboard. The visual aid 
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reinforces the oral lecture. It is more effec-
tive to rely on two senses rather than mere-
ly on one. Do not be shy about asking some 
questions, but avoid those that you can 
answer yourself by looking up the 
company's annual report or filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Finally, I raise the often painful subject 
of Board turnover. I do not view a director-
ship as a type of civil service appointment. 
It should not become a sinecure. To be 
sure, there are important benefits to the 
company from having members whose lon-
gevity provides a wealth of background and 
experience with the company-sometimes 
in excess of that of the current top manage-
ment. Yet, there may be the danger of long-
time directors becoming so accustomed to 
the existing way of doing business that they 
viscerally oppose innovation on the oldest 
bureaucratic grounds: "We have never done 
it that way." Also, the needs of a company 
may change-with shifts in its markets, 
product line, regulatory status, and external 
environment. 
I do not view a directorship as a type of 
civil service appointment. It should not 
become a sinecure. 
All this, of course, underscores the need 
for relying on such eternal values as judg-
ment and balance in the selection and reten-
tion of corporate directors. Although this is 
hardly a startling conclusion, and it may 
sound pedantic, I have never found good 
judgment to be in excess supply in any 
organization that I have been connected 
with, public or private. In any event, there 
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is little that can formally be prescribed, 
other than to be conscious of the need to 
maintain an environment conducive to the 
exercise of those key values. 
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